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Executive summary 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established in 2002 by an Act of 
the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the coordinating anti-corruption 
agency in Nigeria. The statutory powers, coordinative functions and the jurisdiction of the 
EFCC were discussed in Onyema et al. (2018), in which the authors argued that the 
effectiveness of the EFCC to discharge its mandate had been called into question locally and 
internationally over the past decade. This is largely due to the perception by the Nigerian 
public that the EFCC is a tool of the incumbent government to pursue political goals or a 
means of settling political scores with opponents.  
An emerging concern about the effective functioning of the EFCC is that it now serves as a 
‘debt collection agency’ at the disposal of commercial banks, high net-worth individuals and 
even the government. This research examines the extent to which this allegation may be 
true and considers the reasons why these private actors utilise the EFCC for the recovery of 
contractual debts instead of relying on the courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The deeper question examined in this paper is whether these private actors have now 
captured and use the EFCC for their own purposes.  
In analyzing these questions we interrogate the role of the private sector in the 
entrenchment of political corruption in Nigeria, using relevant legal judgments and 
interviews with Nigerian lawyers and their clients as supporting evidence. 
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List of acronyms and abbreviations 
ACA Anti-corruption agencies 
CCB Code of Conduct Bureau     
COTRIMCO Corruption and Financial Cases Trial Monitoring Committee  
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
GTB GT Bank Plc 
ISG Imo State Government 
ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices Commission  
LEA Law enforcement agencies     
NPF Nigerian Police Force  
PPPRA Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency 
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1. Introduction 
Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was created in 2003 by an Act of 
the National Assembly in response to the listing of Nigeria as a non-cooperative country by 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (Obuah, 2010). Addressing corruption 
was a precondition for Nigeria’s acceptance into the international community and for the 
opportunity to participate in international business and to access international financial 
markets (ibid.). The Commission was established through the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act (‘the Act’) to combat all economic and financial crimes in 
Nigeria and was empowered to examine and investigate such crimes.
1
 The Commission was 
also given the role of coordinating all relevant anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Nigeria and 
the power to enforce all laws in Nigeria relating to financial and economic crimes.2 
The enabling statutes of the primary ACAs – which includes the Code of Conduct Bureau 
(CCB), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and even the EFCC itself – 
provide for a multi-pronged approach to combating corruption, that is, a preventive 
approach, an educative approach3 and a prosecutorial approach. However, the emphasis of 
the agencies has been prosecutorial. This paper recognises the prosecutorial anti-corruption 
approach and the growing phenomenon where ACAs go beyond their prosecutorial criminal 
remit by intervening in purely civil or contractual matters relating to the recovery of debt.  
The establishment of a centralized anti-corruption agency that combines approaches in one 
institution for prevention, investigation and education is not a novel idea. The anti‐
corruption success stories of Singapore and Hong Kong encouraged the establishment of 
strong, centralised anti‐corruption agencies. Many countries adopted the Hong Kong and 
Singapore models in fighting corruption by setting up a dedicated anti-corruption agency.4 
However the extent to which the successes experienced in these countries have been 
replicated is debatable (Gorta, 2003; Choi, 2009; Quah, 2010, 2011).  
 
 
 
1
 The Commission was created by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 14 December 2002. 
The Act was repealed by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, Cap E1 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004. See Chawki (2009). 
2
 Section 6(c)(n)and (o) of the EFCC Act. See also Ugo-Ngadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt 1610). 
3
 Section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act Cap C31 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria inter alia empowers the ICPC to (i) 
examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and advise in respect of practices, systems or procedures 
that facilitate fraud or corruption; (ii) instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or parastatal on ways by which fraud or 
corruption may be eliminated or minimized; (iii) educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; 
and (iv) enlist public support in combating corruption. Similarly, Paragraph 14 of the Code of Conduct Standard Operating 
Procedure mandates the CCB to engage in collaborative anti-corruption policies and foster ways of preventing and 
educating on corruption in public places. Section 6(p) of the EFCC Act empowers the EFCC to carry out and sustain rigorous 
public enlightenment campaigns against economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria. 
4
 Some of the countries that have adopted a similar model include Latvia, Australia, Botswana and Uganda. 
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The replication of anti-corruption agencies is relevant to two debates in the Nigerian 
context. On the issue of legal transplants and replication of approaches, the literature is 
replete with both the significance of tackling corruption within the cultural and social 
context of a specific country and the concomitant absence of clear universal solutions 
(Kapoor and Shamika, 2009; Banuri and Eckel, 2012). On a second issue regarding the choice 
of strengthening existing institutions versus establishing a single agency, there is little 
consensus on whether anti-corruption efforts are best served by strengthening existing 
apparatus such as audit institutions and law enforcement authorities. The thrust of this view 
is that public administrative reform with strengthened public institutions, including the civil 
service and judiciary, are more effective at combating corruption than creating a specialised 
anti-corruption agency. 
Determining the effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency is a complicated endeavor for 
several reasons. First, a large degree of corrupt conduct is under-reported and our primary 
tools for assessing the level of corruption within a country rely on perception studies. 
Second, ascribing a causal relationship between the success of an anti-corruption institution 
with the level of corruption in a country fails to consider the multiple factors that cause and 
influence the level of corruption within a country. Notwithstanding the absence of a formal 
study to evaluate the effectiveness of the EFCC, there is a widely held perception that the 
EFCC has been ineffective in successfully combating corruption in Nigeria and has failed to 
fully achieve the objectives for which it was established (Mordi, 2016). This perception has 
been linked to several internal and external factors including political influence, lack of 
adequate funding, operational challenges and an ineffective judicial system, but it has not 
been static. Indeed, changes in perceptions about the EFCC are consistent with the typical 
development cycles of anti-corruption agencies – non-linear development associated with 
the disruption caused by the volatility of government support.  
This paper is not an assessment of the effectiveness of the EFCC in reducing corruption. 
Rather, it considers the second-generation reforms required to improve governance and 
reduce incidents of corruption. In this regard, the extent to which state capture acts as a 
form of corruption that alters the incentives of government institutions is particularly 
relevant. The focus here is the intersection between the buyers of influence (the private 
sector) and the sellers of influence (public officials), and the extent to which this interaction 
distorts the normal functioning of the market. It is imperative to note that one of the 
developments that heralded the anti-corruption crusade of Nigeria was the establishment of 
the ICPC in 2000 with its focus on public-sector corruption. The subsequent EFCC Act vested 
the EFCC with jurisdiction over both public- and private-sector corruption but, at its 
inception, the prosecution of public-sector corruption was not envisaged as falling within the 
portfolio of the EFCC due to the prior existence of the ICPC.   
However, as we shall see in section 3 of this paper on the institutional framework of the 
EFCC, the Act gave a wide definition to the term ‘economic and financial crimes’. This vests 
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the EFCC with power to enforce and/or coordinate the enforcement of all legislations on 
economic and financial crimes whether committed by government officials or private 
citizens. The Supreme Court in the case of Nweke v Federal Republic of Nigeria5 held that the 
powers of the EFCC are not limited to government activities. Rather, that the jurisdiction of 
the EFCC applies wherever an economic and financial crime has been committed, whether 
by government officials or private citizens and hence interaction between EFCC officials and 
the private sector is inevitable.  
As discussed in Onyema et al. (2018), the EFCC suffers from organisational dysfunction such 
as lack of funding, improper training of personnel and internal corruption which has made it 
susceptible to external influence, both in terms of political capture and, as this paper shows, 
private-sector capture.6 The susceptibility of the EFCC to capture by private citizens was 
succinctly highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Gaul Ihenacho v Nigerian Police, when it 
held: 
There are usually dire consequences at every turn of event where lawlessness is 
condoned and perpetrated rather than doing the sacred biddings of the law. The 
spate of lawlessness and recklessness in the polity cannot be condoned be they 
the handiwork of private individuals or state government executives whose 
heads and top officials are expected to know better. Chasing after an adversary 
and hounding him with state sponsored law enforcement agents paid with the 
sweat of taxpayers toil rather than keeping to the terms of binding agreements is 
another form of aberration that must be strictly viewed. (Mr. Gaul Ihenacho & 3 
Ors. v. the Nigerian Police Force & 2 Ors (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt 1580) 424)  
State capture has traditionally been treated as a subset of corruption. It is defined from an 
institutionalist perspective, as the misuse of public office for private gain through influence 
over institution-making (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). The concept of state capture as a form of 
corruption in which firms make private payments to public officials to influence the choice 
and design of laws, rules and regulations is well established. Similarly established is the 
distinction between the preceding form of corruption and administrative corruption, 
wherein private individuals seek to alter the prescribed implementation of laws, rules and 
regulations through private payments to public officials (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001).  
The type of corruption we focus on in this paper lies at the interstices of both forms of 
corruption in that private individuals co-opt the machinery of the state to achieve their own 
private objectives. In this regard, we review the recent phenomenon where the private 
sector engages the Commission for the settlement of commercial disputes and its use for the 
recovery of debts by commercial banks. This differs from public-sector corruption in that the 
private individuals do not seek to influence policy choices or circumvent the implementation 
 
 
5
 (2019) 10 NWLR Pt 1679 51 at p.70 
6
 See Onyema et al. (2009) and Ikpeze,Nnamdi (2013) 
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of policies. Rather, they use the resources of the state to implement their own desired policy 
ends. This seemingly benign form of state capture raises important political-economy issues 
that touch upon fundamental aspects of the design of the enforcement system and the 
interactions between businesses and government institutions.  
Section 2 of this paper discusses the political economy of regulatory capture as it relates to 
the functions and powers of the EFCC. Section 3 addresses the institutional framework for 
the operation of the EFCC and Section 4 examines how some private actors use the EFCC as 
a debt-collection agency. Section 5 sets out our recommendations and section 6 our 
conclusions. 
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2. The political economy of the EFCC 
as an anti-corruption agency in a 
developing economy 
The EFCC has often been politically captured, but it has also been an effective anti-
corruption agency. In particular, the Commission saw some early successes in tackling 
money laundering investigations (Gbolahan, 2007; Lawrence, 2009; Onyema et al., 2018). 
The consolidation of its powers under the EFCC Act as both an investigator and prosecutor 
made it the key coordinating agency for all financial crimes including money laundering, 
bribery, fraud, tax evasion, smuggling, oil bunkering and a host of other issues critical for a 
well-functioning Nigerian economy. But, given its wide-ranging powers, it has also been 
subject to frequent political interference and political corruption (Lawrence, 2009; Onyema 
et al., 2018; Congressional Research Service, 2019). 
It is certainly a plausible contention that the establishment of the EFCC provided Nigeria 
with the credibility to, among other things, participate in international financial markets as 
well as perform better in the influential Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) devised by 
Transparency International.7 However, while the agency notched up some early effective 
drives against corruption, its operations in later years have been in line with the 
performance of most ACAs in developing countries – that is, having an impact that is best 
described as ‘fair’ (Johnsøn et al., 2012). One of the reasons for the sliding, or at least 
inconsistent performance of the EFCC, can be ascribed to the fact that when the agency was 
founded other powerful organisations in the Nigerian political settlement (which we 
describe as an alignment between the distribution of power and distribution of benefits, as 
in Khan, 2018) had not yet ‘adjusted’ to its operations. Gradually, however, political 
incumbents began to co-opt its mandate in line with their own organisational power, which 
is one reason why individuals have been able to direct the EFCC’s anti-corruption activities 
towards opposition politicians more effectively than towards their own politicians. This type 
of corruption is a form of rent-creation and capture through powerful informal patron-client 
network through which political groups stay in power (Khan, 2006; Khan et al., 2019).  
While identifying the more politically motivated instances of political corruption can be 
difficult, this paper focuses on an aspect of misuse of the EFCC’s mandate that we identify as 
damaging to the aims of the Commission. A recent trend in the workings of the EFCC has 
been the conduct of fraud investigations which are a criminal matter, in matters of debt 
collection which is essentially a civil matter. As we identify later in this paper, one key reason 
for this is the procedural delays parties have to face in the civil-legal architecture for debt 
 
 
7
 See https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  
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recovery. This can be described as market-restriction-driven corruption (ibid.) as distortions 
in the contractual ecosystem required for settling commercial disputes compel parties to 
resort to misuse of the EFCC’s mandate. Another reason is linked to large private-sector 
players like powerful banks who can use their (informal) connections with the EFCC to 
influence investigations.  
One of the most high-profile cases of this nature was a series of litigations and investigation 
involving Innocent Chukwuma, a leading Nigerian entrepreneur auto assembler and 
importer; GT Bank (GTB), one of Nigeria’s largest banks; and the EFCC. The details of this 
case are complicated and lengthy and began in the nature of a commercial dispute between 
GTB and Chukwuma’s company Innoson, but at some point the EFCC stepped in to 
commence investigations into allegations of fraud by the latter. Media reports suggested 
this was at the behest of GTB (Chiedozie, 2018; Ogunnubi, 2019). The complex nature of the 
dispute is not just of debt recovery, which is one reason the case has not been highlighted in 
this paper. However, we examine four not-so-high-profile but relevant cases in section 4 to 
highlight how the EFCC is being used as an instrument for debt collection, given its vast 
investigative and prosecutorial mandates. 
As mentioned above, the corruption problem we identify is of two types – market-
restriction-driven corruption and political corruption. What is important for us to analyse is 
which of these is relatively easier to address. As laid out in Khan et al. (2019) the first is 
relatively easier to address in terms of feasibility as instances of market-restriction-driven 
corruption are usually linked less to powerful political networks and more to individual 
discretion of officials (though they can also on occasion be linked to political networks). 
What appears to work here is a ‘disincentive’ structure in the civil architecture for debt 
recovery (referred to in Section 3) that discourages agents from being rule-following and 
those with the reach and ability lodge criminal complaints with investigative agencies like 
the EFCC and Nigerian Police Force (NPF) to intervene in debt recovery. Through our 
research, it is also clear that polices targeting this form of corruption will be impactful given 
that debt collection is a ‘function creep’ for the EFCC, diverting scarce financial and human 
resources into areas that are not of the scope and importance to deserve its attention. 
Function creep is normally used to refer to technologies but, in this case, it occurs as the 
functioning of the EFCC is completely subverted. This is important when the Nigerian 
economy has to deal with critical instances of rent-capture like smuggling, oil bunkering, 
foreign exchange round tripping, etc. In any case, the use of a public body for private 
purposes can be credibly regarded as wasteful.  
On the other hand, political corruption is a structural feature of developing countries and 
hence is difficult to address. The main reason for this is the existence of a ‘rule by law’ – that 
is, selective law enforcement over the good governance benchmark of ‘rule of law’, where 
law enforcement is impartial (Khan, 2018). Of course rules in most countries are enforced on 
a spectrum of rule of, to rule by, law.  
In developed countries the economy by definition is complex and there are many productive 
organisations with a relative level playing field among powerful organisations. In such a 
situation transactions have to be impersonal and based on contracts and their enforcement. 
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Following the rule of law is important as it is the only way to ensure that parties are 
protected while dealing with an entity they don’t know personally. The incentive structure in 
society among agents is therefore broadly aligned for impartial enforcement.  
Developing-country societies are characterised by a few powerful organisations that may not 
be productive but that use their organisational power to distort laws to capture rents and 
escape being penalised. This is especially true when politics is defined by informal rent flows 
and patron–client relations. In fact, organisations break rules in order to accumulate and it is 
therefore not in their interest to be rule-following. This also works in the context of the EFCC 
and powerful private players where the ACA’s extensive mandate can be misinterpreted by 
powerful interests for private gains. It is common knowledge among legal and banking 
professionals that large banks in the country have to maintain good working relationships 
with the EFCC. How far these extend cannot be credibly open to comment. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that these links can be asymmetric in nature compared to many other 
private-sector players.  
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3. The institutional framework for 
the operation of the EFCC 
At the EFCC’s inception it was focused on investigating and prosecuting financial crimes such 
as fraud, money laundering and public-sector corruption. Advanced fee fraud was also a key 
target of the EFCC, and it successfully investigated and prosecuted such offences.8 One 
major success for the EFCC was the successful conviction of Nigerians who were involved in 
defrauding the Brazilian bank Banco Noroeste of over US$240 million.9 The EFCC soon 
became the foremost ACA ahead of bodies such as the CCB, the NPF, the ICPC, the National 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit and the 
Public Complaint Commission as it had the backing of the country’s first civilian president 
after the restoration of democracy in 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo. Subsequently, the EFCC 
became Nigeria’s primary ACA responsible for recovering corrupt proceeds from senior 
government officials and received international support aimed at bolstering the efforts of 
the government to combat economic and financial crimes.
10
  
The EFCC’s initial activities against corruption appeared to be effective. It filed criminal 
charges against several politicians between 2004 and 2010,11 which included former 
governors, ministers,12 and heads of public agencies.13 This was done through the widely 
drafted powers contained in Section 6 of the EFCC Act to the effect that the EFCC is 
responsible for the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money 
laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent 
encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, and contract scams, etc. 
Furthermore, Section 7 of the EFCC Act empowers the EFCC to investigate whether any 
person, body or organisation has committed an offence under the EFCC Act or other laws 
relating to economic and financial crimes. Between 2003 and 2006, the EFCC obtained about 
92 convictions (Taiwo Osipitan and Abiodun Odusote, 2014). By the end of 2006, the 
Commission received over 4,200 petitions on corruption-related cases, of which it 
investigated 1,200 cases and prosecuted 406 (Obuah 2010a ).  
 
 
8
 For example, Fred Chijundu Ajudua v Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
9
 See https://www.cbn.gov.ng/419/anejemba.asp  
10
 Ms. Linda Thomas-Greenfield was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Bureau of African Affairs, 
Department of State. Her speech is contained in the Report of the Hearing of the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relation’s Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Right and International Operations, 
Washington 18 May, 2006, US Government Printing Office No.109-172, 28.   
11
 Former Governors included Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State, Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State, Lucky Igbenedion of Edo 
State, James Ibori of Delta State, Gabriel Suswam of Benue State 
12
 Former Ministers include Mr Femi Fani Kayode, Mr Babalola Borishade, and Ms Stella Oduah. 
13
 Including two former Inspector Generals of Police Tafa Balogun and Sunday Ehindero, and former managing director of 
the Nigerian Ports Authority Mr Bode George. 
Anti-corruption agencies as debt recovery agents: the unintended consequences of anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria 
13 
The Corruption and Financial Cases Trial Monitoring Committee (COTRIMCO) was mandated 
by the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Walter Onnoghen, with identifying factors 
responsible for delays in the disposition of corruption and financial crimes cases in Nigeria 
(Oye, 2018). COTRIMCO monitored corruption and financial crimes cases being prosecuted 
in the Nigerian courts, reviewed the judgments delivered by the courts and published an 
interim report in April 2018 (‘the Interim Report’) on cases prosecuted by ACAs in Nigeria. 
The report confirmed that 175 cases of the 297 examined were prosecuted by the EFCC, 
while the ICPC and the NPF prosecuted 13 and 5 cases respectively (Adesomoju, 2019). The 
Interim Report concluded that the EFCC remains most active of the ACAs in terms of 
numbers of prosecutions and/or convictions in corruption and financial crime cases (ibid.). 
This supports our own finding from Onyema et al. (2018), which revealed that between 2010 
and 2015 the EFCC had received 36,442 petitions, investigated 15,124 petitions, prosecuted 
2,460 petitions and secured 568 corruption convictions. 
3.1. The scope of the EFCC’s statutory powers 
The EFCC’s extensive powers were granted in a peculiar manner. Rather than enumerating 
specific offences, the Commission is conferred with the power to investigate any offence 
that may be considered an economic or financial crime under any law in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the EFCC is permitted to conduct investigations into any property where it 
appears that the value of the property or lifestyle of the owner of the property may not be 
justified by the income of the owner. This is a broad remit. 
In addition to its general investigative powers, the Commission has a coordination function 
too. The EFCC is the chief coordinating ACA in Nigeria with the power to coordinate and 
supervise the enforcement of all economic and financial crimes within the country.14 
Consequently, the Commission is required to liaise with other law enforcement agencies 
(LEA) and work cooperatively in the enforcement and prevention of economic and financial 
crimes.
15
 Included in this mandate is the responsibility for collaborating with other entities 
with respect to criminal activities in matters connected to the extradition or deportation of 
suspects.16 
With respect to the central theme of this paper, that is, the use of the EFCC as a debt-
recovery agent, it is important to have a working understanding of what constitutes an 
‘economic and financial crime’ which is distinguishable from default arising from a civil debt 
obligation. The EFCC Act broadly defines economic and financial crimes to cover: 
 
 
14
 Section 6(c)(n)and (o) of the EFCC Act. See also  Ugo-Ngadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt 1610).  
15
 EFCC Act (n 3) s 7; Lawrence (n 7) 341. 
16
 Section 6(1)(j) of the EFCC Act. 
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…non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objectives of earning 
wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby 
violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of government 
and its administration and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, 
money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt 
malpractice, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labor, 
illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractice 
including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, 
open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods, etc. (EFCC Act 
(n 3) S 46)  
Given the laundry-list approach adopted by the drafters of the statute, there is a sense that 
the intention was to bring any illegal activity that leads to illegitimate wealth accumulation 
within the purview of the Commission. Indeed, the drafters also contemplated the possibility 
that there may be future activities not specifically enumerated that could be covered by the 
statute by using the term ‘include’ which is a permissive expression in the rule of statutory 
interpretation.
17
 The Act accordingly permits the introduction of any act or omission not 
expressly mentioned in the definition section so long it is an illegal activity for financial gains 
which violate existing laws. The use of the permissive expression combined with the 
legislative phrase ‘existing legislation’ and section 7(f) of the EFCC Act granting the 
Commission the power to enforce any other law or regulation on economic and financial 
crimes suggests that any non-violent act which is prohibited under any law in force 
performed with the intention to acquire wealth would amount to an economic or financial 
crime. 
The legislator in continuation of the intention to broaden the scope of economic and 
financial crimes beyond the conducts contained in the above statutory definition and 
particularly the offences contained in Sections 14 to 18 of the Act drafted the Act such that 
the jurisdiction of the EFCC shall apply to offences stipulated in the provisions of the Money 
Laundering Act,
18
 the Advance Fee Fraud Act,
19
 the Failed Banks Act,
20
 the Banks and other  
 
 
17
 The Supreme Court per Chukwunweike Idigbe JSC (as he then was) in Rabiu v Kano State (1980) 8 – 11 SC (Reprint) 85 in 
defining the word ‘include’ made the following pronouncement ‘it has, in my respectful view, quite rightly been said that 
sometimes, however, the word “include” is used in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body 
of a statute; and when it is so used those or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things they signify 
according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include’ (see 
Lord Watson in Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC. 99 at 105 and 106). 
18
 Money Laundering (Prohibition Act) Act 2011 (as amended). 
19
 Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, Cap A6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
20
 Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractice in Banks Act 1994 (as Amended), Cap F2 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Financial Institutions Act,
21
 and the Miscellaneous Offences Act.
22
 Hence, the term 
‘economic and financial crimes’ extends to the provisions of any other laws or regulations 
which prohibit any economic and financial act or omission including but not limited to the 
Criminal Code Act,
23
 and the Penal Code Act.
24
  
3.2. Interaction between criminal and civil disputes 
The distinction between civil and criminal law has been a persistent and unwieldy issue in 
common law jurisdictions. At a high level of abstraction, a civil case involves a dispute 
between two or more parties on a particular issue. Criminal law on the other hand is 
concerned with the contravention of specific offences defined by statute. Generally, civil 
cases are brought by private individuals, while criminal cases are brought by the state in 
response to the violations of a covered rule (Asein, 2005). The remedies available under civil 
law are often monetary compensation in the form of damages or, in some instances, 
equitable relief such as injunctions and specific performance of contractual obligations. 
Criminal law, on the other hand, focuses on the enforcement of codified criminal statutes, 
whose infringement is punishable by the state with imprisonment and/or payments of fines 
(Obilade, 1979). Criminal law is typically enforced by the state, though private enforcement 
may be permissible in exceptional circumstances mostly by the fiat of the Attorney General 
of a state, Attorney General of the Federation or by proceedings instigated by a private 
individual through a mandatory order of a court of competent jurisdiction in the form of 
mandamus (Okagbue, 1990; Ogowewo, 1995).  
In other words, whilst civil law addresses the rights and duties between individuals and with 
private duties and claims arising from tort, contract or otherwise, criminal law addresses 
wrongs committed against the public, which wrongs have been proscribed by a statute and 
the punishment prescribed in the said statute.25 Furthermore, while the object of criminal 
law is largely retributive/punitive and to a limited extent deterrent, the objective of the civil 
law regime is largely compensatory in the forms of damages and in other circumstances to 
prevent civil infractions through injunctions or to compel performance of civil obligations by 
 
 
21
 Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, Cap B1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The Commission relied on the 
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an order of specific performance (Obilade, 1979; Asein, 2005). Box 1 briefly describes the 
judicial hierarchy in Nigeria.  
Box 1. Nigeria’s judicial hierarchy 
The Nigerian judicial system is as contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Section 6 of the Constitution enumerates the Superior 
Courts of Record in the following hierarchy: Supreme Court of Nigeria, Court of Appeal 
of Nigeria (Court of Appeal), the Sharia Court of Appeal, Customary Court of Appeal, 
High Court of the States, High Court of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. There are lower 
courts such as area courts in the north, customary courts and magistrate courts (Inferior 
Court). Appeals lie from the Inferior Courts to the High Courts or the Sharia Court or 
Customary Court on matters of sharia law and native law and custom respectively. 
Matters appealed to the High Courts from the Inferior Courts or matters instituted at 
first instance are appealable to the Court of Appeal. Every decision of the Court of 
Appeal is appealable to the apex Nigerian court, the Supreme Court. 
 
It is, however, imperative to note that a set of facts could straddle applicability in both civil 
law and criminal law. Both the civil and/or the criminal elements of a case can be pursued 
either simultaneously or in succession under Nigerian law.
26
 And the mere fact that a civil 
contract contains an arbitration clause mandating the parties to submit any dispute to 
arbitration does not prevent the EFCC from investigating elements of economic and financial 
crimes arising from the transaction.27 Consequently, the EFCC is not precluded from 
investigating allegations of economic and financial crime in civil transactions as a result of 
ongoing civil proceedings. This observation is extremely salient as it helps us to consider the 
question of why it has been easy for interested parties to utilise the EFCC’s jurisdiction in 
matters of debt collection. Our research points to the fact that lawyers, when briefed, search 
for the criminal nature of the set of facts to bring it within the purview of the EFCC. Where 
there is an element of an economic and financial crime, they file a petition with the EFCC. 
However, some lawyers still file petitions with the EFCC even when there is no suggestion of 
criminality. 
A practical illustration is in the facts of the case of Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission v Yanaty Petrochemical Limited Yanaty.
28
 This case highlights how the ambiguity 
between civil and criminal can nudge the EFCC to pursue the criminal nature of the 
proceedings when a case also has a significant civil element. In this case, Yanaty 
Petrochemical Ltd (Yanaty) instituted a civil action at the Federal High Court (the first suit) 
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against the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), a state-owned 
organisation responsible for regulating downstream oil prices, challenging its power to 
unilaterally demand for the extension of the duration of an Advance Payment Guarantee 
(APG).29 In this case Sterling Bank Plc issued an APG in respect of a fuel subsidy contract 
between Yanaty and the PPPRA. What follows is a summarised description of the 
proceedings between the two, the facts of which demonstrate the key issue of concerns in 
this paper, namely, the consequence of the lack of clarity on key legal principles that can 
lead to the intervention of the EFCC in matters that can touch on both civil and criminal law. 
We argue this is a drain on the EFCC’s capacity to function as an effective ACA. 
Yanaty instituted a suit against the PPPRA seeking an order against the attempt by the latter 
to extend the duration of the APG because Yanaty’s dealings in respect of Nigeria’s extensive 
fuel subsidy programme were under investigation (first suit). Before Yanaty had commenced 
the first suit the PPPRA had petitioned the EFCC, alleging Yanaty had committed fraud and 
money laundering with respect to payment of the fuel subsidy. The contention was this 
needed criminal investigations by law and investigations were ongoing whilst the first suit 
was pending. Yanaty then instituted another suit (the second suit) against the EFCC, for a 
declaration that because of the judgment in the first suit – that the PPPRA could not extend 
the APG on the premise of ongoing criminal investigation – the EFCC could not open any 
further investigation into the issue. In the second suit the Federal High Court held that the 
EFCC lacked the power to carry out an investigation into the transactions between PPPRA 
and Yanaty.  
The decision of the Federal High Court in the second suit was reversed by the Court of 
Appeal. Yanaty, dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, appealed to the 
Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, in 
reversing the decision of the Federal High Court, held that a judgment in a civil suit does not 
preclude the EFCC from investigating an allegation of fraud and money laundering which are 
economic and financial crimes. The Court of Appeal further held that the EFCC, like any other 
investigating agency, has wide discretionary power under the enabling law to investigate, 
close an investigation, re-open an investigation and carry out further investigation in the 
manner permitted by the law. The Court of Appeal concluded that any order of injunction 
restraining the EFCC from investigating allegations of economic and financial crimes would 
amount to unwarranted interference with the exercise of the statutory powers and 
functions of the Commission. The case is authority for the proposition that a civil suit does 
not constrain the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Commission. It is clear that 
the dispute between the PPPRA and Yanaty started out as a purely commercial dispute over 
the extension of the duration of an APG.  
 
 
29
 An APG is a guarantee issued by a commercial bank on behalf of its customer in favour of an institution engaging the 
services of the bank’s customer. 
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Many developed countries including the United Kingdom have developed the concept of 
parallel proceedings which could have been of huge persuasive effect on the decisions of the 
Court if Yanaty had canvassed the argument in the Yanaty case. Parallel proceedings occur 
when two or more investigations or actions, concerning allegations arising from the same (or 
substantially the same) set of facts, proceed simultaneously or successively against the same 
or related parties (Hunter, 2003; Loewenson, 2004). Consequently, the Court in its decision 
paid limited attention to the fact that it was dealing with parallel proceedings. We explain 
why in subsequent paragraphs in the section. 
When one tries to reduce these concerns to legal concepts, there appear to be two avenues 
for analysis. Typically, the actions (civil and criminal) may be brought by the state or the civil 
action may be brought by a private plaintiff. The parallel proceedings in the Yanaty case 
above raise two particular concerns for the private party, that is, the right of a person not to 
be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence in the course of a proceedings (‘self-
incrimination’)30 and the issue of estoppel. The principle of estoppel prevents a party to an 
action from disputing against the other party in any subsequent suit, matters which had 
been adjudicated upon previously by a court of competent jurisdiction involving the same 
issues and between the same parties. The principle of self-incrimination suggests the 
constitutional right of a person to remain silent during an investigation and/or trial which is 
inviolable.31 The principle of self-incrimination would be relevant where the party to the civil 
case seeks to use findings in a prior criminal case as evidence in the subsequent civil case. 
That is, can a party in a civil case be compelled to produce in evidence the findings in an 
earlier criminal case which may not be in that party’s interest? 
Considering the fact that Yanaty had premised the core of their case on the principle of 
estoppel, the Supreme Court decided that the principle of estoppel was not applicable since 
the defendants in the first suit and the second suit were different, particularly as the EFCC 
was not a party to the first suit. In addition, the subject matter of the previous suit (the APG) 
and the subsequent suit (on fuel subsidies) were different. As such, the Court held that the 
investigation of the EFCC was well within its statutory powers. The decision of the Courts in 
Yanaty’s case focused on the question of estoppel as raised and argued by Yanaty whilst the 
issue of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination was never raised and thus 
not considered by the Courts. The Court did acknowledge that a plaintiff is entitled to rely on 
a previous judgment related to the present issue. It also recognised that the previous 
judgment referred to would be conclusive.  
The legal principle of parallel proceedings becomes important here in the context of civil and 
criminal cases in the following way. In criminal cases, there is the presumption of innocence 
of the charged party. Civil cases are based on balance of probability via the evidence 
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provided. Hence, someone can engage a party in a civil suit and record their response and 
evidence. This response can then be used against the party in a criminal case. The opposite 
can also happen, that is findings in a criminal suit can be used in a civil case. And as our later 
examples show, this is frequently seen in the case of the EFCC and links closely to its role in 
debt recovery. In this case a party can lodge a criminal complaint against a second party. In a 
civil suit the second party would have no obligation to respond, but that is not the case in a 
criminal suit. Hence, once the second party responds, the EFCC can investigate or start 
operations against the second party (such as raids etc.) to gather evidence. This evidence 
can then be used in a civil case such as debt recovery. In this circumstance, it is the failure to 
inform the party in the civil proceeding that the EFCC was contemplating a criminal 
investigation and prosecution that requires further analysis. The concern here is that due 
process would not be followed as the civil suit would enable the EFCC to discover the party’s 
defences to future criminal charges before the criminal trial. 
In the context of debt recovery it is simple enough to make a complaint with the EFCC which 
will then commence criminal investigations. Once this happens the EFCC can be used as an 
instrument of coercion, without the EFCC playing any willing part in this. Powerful parties 
can then force the second party to settle the dispute on the threat of the criminal 
proceeding. This lies at the heart of the issue of using the EFCC’s mandate for solving 
peripheral, and more importantly in many cases, private disputes which have very little to do 
with the larger issues of governance. If the rules around parallel proceedings were clarified, 
this principle could be used to stop parties from using the EFCC in this manner. 
It can easily be discerned why the Court focused its decision on the issue of estoppel and not 
the principle of privilege against self-incrimination. Firstly, the issue of estoppel formed the 
crux of Yanaty’s case and the foundation of its argument. Nigeria operates an adversarial 
judicial system, which means the Court as an impartial arbiter is precluded from making a 
case or an argument for and on behalf of a party. The judge decides based on the facts and 
evidence placed before it by the parties and does not engage in any inquiry outside those 
placed by the parties. Secondly, any Court faced with the prospect of limiting the powers of 
the EFCC to investigate or prosecute an economic and financial crime would consider this to 
be an interference with the exercise of the statutory powers of the EFCC. Nonetheless, the 
Court recognised that it is empowered to, in an appropriate circumstance, grant an order of 
injunction to protect the existing right of a person from unlawful invasion by another. The 
Court, however, failed to clarify the remit of the powers of the EFCC and this failure only 
encourages potential abuse to continue.  
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4. Debt collection and the role of the 
Commission 
Sometimes a case may initially appear to be of a civil nature or may involve a commercial 
transaction. But such disputes may also contain ingredients of criminal offences. In this 
section, we document the phenomenon where parties to a commercial dispute initiate 
criminal proceedings in what appears to be a purely civil dispute. The incentives for this 
include the opportunity to pressure the other party into a favourable settlement, using the 
broader powers available in criminal proceedings, and raising transaction costs for the other 
party by embroiling them in criminal proceedings. We firstly examine cases where the courts 
have raised the issue and the contemporary explanation for why the private sector uses the 
EFCC. Secondly, we examine the policy considerations pertaining to prosecutorial 
independence and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
The Nigerian judicial system is characterised by challenges typical to the judicial systems of 
most developing economies.
32
 These include protracted litigation and delays in the 
resolution of commercial disputes. It has been established that unreasonable delays is one 
of the prime factors why citizens and private institutions explore the use of LEAs to settle 
commercial transactions.
33
 Litigants who wish to enforce the breach of contractual 
obligations in the courts, risk delay (resulting in higher cost) in the resolution of their 
disputes. The delay in the civil justice system becomes compounded where either of the 
parties appeals the decision of the trial court or where there is further appeal from the Court 
of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, litigation is an expensive venture owing to 
the payment of the statutory filing fees and most especially costs pertaining to the activities 
of the attorney. Parties to disputes arising from commercial transactions may weigh the cost 
of litigation with the monetary value of the judgment at the end of the day more so in view 
of their opportunity costs.  
Consequently, businesses make commercial decisions as to the enforcement mechanism 
that meets their business objectives in terms of time and returns. Creditors thus consider 
LEAs, such as the EFCC more efficient and expedient in view of their coercive powers. From 
our key informant interviews including experienced legal practitioners, it appears that 
 
 
32
 A detail of the challenges inherent in the judicial systems of the developing countries are highlighted by Ofosu-Amaah 
(2002).  
33
  Ariavie concluded that citizen resort to the use of law enforcement agencies to settle commercial transaction in order to 
avoid tortuous civil litigation process. A similar conclusion was established by Proshare consequent upon their investigation 
and interview of the officials of commercial banks in Nigeria on the reason for the preference for law enforcement agencies 
over civil litigation mechanism for debt recovery. It was reported that commercial banks in Nigeria would rather use law 
enforcement agencies for debt recovery with guarantee that the debt would be recovered within a short time than 
recourse to recovery agent (solicitors) that would likely not recover the debts within the commercially reasonable time. See 
Victor Ariavie (n 65); See also (n 67). 
Anti-corruption agencies as debt recovery agents: the unintended consequences of anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria 
21 
creditors have taken a cue of the trend and find the coercive force of LEAs such as the EFCC 
more effective in pursuing the recovery of debts owed to them. The fear of the EFCC’s 
mandate does not only linger in the minds of those who intend to commit economic crimes. 
Citizens are also aware that an investigation by the EFCC can end up being a form of 
harassment.
34
 This perception (and use) of the EFCC’s powers are certainly an unintended 
consequence of the statute. But it is one policy makers need to be aware. 
4.1. Example legal cases 
The delays in litigating civil disputes are largely attributable to the actions of litigants 
themselves and/or their legal representatives. Such actions include requests for 
adjournments or frivolous preliminary objections. Parties to the disputes arising from 
commercial transaction may also weigh the cost of litigation with the monetary value of the 
judgment especially where the value of such compensation is likely to have depreciated due 
to inflation.
35
 Due to this protracted nature of litigation and time-consuming practice of 
litigants in commercial disputes36 and the attendant costs, private citizens often resort to 
LEAs to settle commercial disputes despite the fact that the LEAs are conferred with criminal 
and not civil jurisdiction.
37
 Creditors therefore consider LEAs, such as the EFCC more 
efficient and expedient in view of their coercive powers. As mentioned earlier it is not 
uncommon among legal practitioners and litigants for debtors who had evaded service of 
civil court processes or had employed other delaying strategies to frustrate recovery of debt 
in civil courts to respond to invitation from law enforcement agencies, particularly the EFCC 
in the first instance. 
In this Section, we will highlight several cases from the Nigerian courts where disputants 
resorted to the EFCC and other LEAs in the enforcement of civil obligations. These cases are 
a reflection that not only private sector participants, such as commercial banks, but even the 
Government and agencies of the Government use the EFCC as a tool for enforcing civil 
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contracts when the government and their agencies transact in a commercial capacity and 
not strictly in their functionality as an organ of the state.  
Skye Bank Plc v Emerson Njoku & 2 Ors.
38
 
Skye Bank Plc (now Polaris Bank) granted a credit facility to Nkpola Investment which was 
guaranteed by Emerson Njoku (the majority shareholder in Nkpola Investment). Nkpola 
Investment did not repay the facility. Skye Bank complained to the Police and the EFCC 
(instead of pursuing a civil claim in the courts). The Police arrested and detained Njoku. He 
then issued three cheques to the Bank in satisfaction of the outstanding sums of the credit 
facility following which he was released by the Police. Njoku thereafter filed an action 
against Skye Bank, the Nigerian Police and the EFCC for breaches of his fundamental human 
rights to personal liberty and personal dignity protected in the Constitution. The High Court 
held that there was a breach by Njoku (in defaulting on the credit facility) but that the 
remedy should be a civil suit before the courts and not a criminal matter for prosecution by 
the Police or EFCC. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal in upholding the decision of the High Court laid the 
consequence of unlawful interference in civil dispute by law enforcement agencies as follows: 
We have deprecated, several times, the tendency of a creditor, resorting to the 
Police to force his debtor to settle simple debts or bank loan, and the willingness 
of the Police to do so, using their coercive powers, wrongly, to violate the 
fundamental rights of the debtor… part that employs the police or any law 
enforcement agency, to violate the fundamental rights of a citizen should be 
ready to face the consequences, either alone or with the misguided Agency. The 
police have no business helping parties to settle or recover debt. We have 
deprecated resort by aggrieved creditors to the police to arrest their debtors, 
using one guise of criminal wrong doing or another… law enforcement agency 
that allows himself to be used by any member of the public, to commit illegality 
that results in damages and liability to the agency or government should be 
made to pay such cost or damages, personally, either in part or in whole, if this 
can serve to warn such officer to act within the rules and scope of his office.39 
The Court of Appeal stressed that commercial transactions may be tainted by criminality, 
thereby making such transactions fall within ‘the middle ground’ classification which is open 
for investigation by the law enforcement agencies. Therefore, save in such instances, the law 
enforcement agencies are precluded from interfering in contractual or commercial disputes. 
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Mr. Gaul Ihenacho & 3 Ors. v. the Nigerian Police Force & 2 Ors
40
  
Imo State Government (ISG) engaged Compudata International (Nigeria) Limited to provide 
revenue consultancy services and when a dispute arose Compudata filed a civil suit against 
the ISG. In response the ISG filed a petition against Compudata, Gaul Ihenacho, the 
promoter of the company and two other officers of Compudata at the office of the Nigerian 
Police Force and the EFCC. Consequently, Compudata and Ihenacho filed a fundamental 
rights action for the protection of their right to personal liberty.
41
  
The Court of Appeal ruling on the impropriety of filing a petition with the Nigerian Police 
Force and EFCC in respect of the dispute arising from an alleged civil wrong held as follows: 
The question that therefore readily agitates the minds of court is whether the 
EFCC or any other law enforcement agency can act as a commercial or 
contractual enforcer of the agreement between the parties and as a result, 
resort to their usual tactics of arresting, detaining and torturing whoever the 
perceived defaulting side to the agreement is? 
The Court of Appeal stated that the powers of the EFCC and other law enforcement agencies 
are limited to wrongs which are ipso facto criminal violations or wrongs with criminal 
attributes in a civil transaction.  
The mere facts that a few elements of the NPF and also lately the EFCC are 
usually invited into just about any or every matter under the sun is no 
justification to get them involved in the resolution of civil disputes.  
Finally, the court delineated the scope for criminal and civil law stating that:  
Here is a matter in which the contractual agreement entered into by the parties 
and to which they remained bound until the contrary is decided as provided for 
the resolution of any dispute between them by arbitration and not to resort to 
the involvement of law enforcement agencies.”42  
What this means that in the case of a commercial agreement between parties where the 
parties have agreed on a means of settling their disputes for instance through arbitration, 
the parties should resort to the dispute resolution mechanism agreed and not resort to law 
enforcement agencies. 
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Economic and Financial Crimes Commission v. Diamond Bank Plc & 2 Ors
43
  
Petro Continental Nigeria Limited (“Petro-Continental”) was a customer of Diamond Bank Plc 
(“Diamond Bank”) and obtained a loan from Diamond Bank. The credit facility was secured 
by floating charges, debentures as well as mortgage on the property of Peter Opara, a 
promoter of Petro-Continental. Petro-Continental commissioned an audit of the account for 
the loan which allegedly unearthed excessive interest charged and deducted by Diamond 
Bank.  As a result Petro-Continental demanded a refund and subsequently referred the issue 
of excessive interest and arbitrary bank charges to the Chartered Institute of Bankers 
Committee on Ethics and Professionalism (CIBC Committee) for determination by the 
consensus of the parties. While the complaint of Petro-Continental was pending with the 
CIBC Committee, Diamond Bank filed a criminal petition against Petro-Continental and 
Opara with the Financial Malpractice Investigation Unit of the NPF Criminal Investigations 
Department which resulted in the arrest and detention of Opara.  
He was not granted bail until he made a payment of 1 Million Naira and Opara issued a 
cheque for an additional 1 Million Naira in favour of Diamond Bank. When Petro-Continental 
and Opara filed a fundamental right action at the court in respect of the arrest of Opara, 
Diamond Bank filed a petition with the Bank Fraud Unit of the EFCC. Upon an invitation from 
the EFCC for investigation, Petro-Continental and Opara filed another action at the Federal 
High Court for enforcement of their fundamental human rights to personal liberty which was 
declined by the Federal High Court. Petro-Continental and Opara appealed to the Court of 
Appeal and the Court of Appeal decided in favour of Petro-Continental and Opara that the 
letter of invitation from the EFCC at the behest of Diamond Bank was unconstitutional and 
infringes Opara’s fundamental human right. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, the EFCC appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal of the EFCC. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the power of the Commission did not extend to the 
category of facts that are clearly civil breaches or wrongs. The Supreme Court stated that: 
It is important for me to pause and say here that the powers conferred on the 
appellant, i.e. the EFCC to receive complaints and prevent and/or fight the 
Commission (sic) of Financial Crimes in Nigeria pursuant to section 6 (b) of the 
EFCC Act (supra) does not extend to the investigation and/or resolution of 
disputes arising or resulting from simple contract or civil transactions as in this 
case.44 
The Court refrained from curtailing the powers of the EFCC to investigate but indicated their 
responsibility to exercise their judgement in the scrutiny of complaints. 
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The EFCC has an inherent duty to scrutinized all complaints that it receives 
carefully, no matter how carefully crafted by the complaining party, and be bold 
enough to counsel such complainants to seek appropriate/lawful means to 
resolve their disputes. Alas! The EFCC is not a debt recovery agency and should 
refrain from being used as such.45 
As mentioned in Section 1 the legal tussle between Innoson and GTB has been one of the 
most high profile cases in this context. The case began when Innoson obtained credit 
facilities from GTB to import a consignment of motorcycles but ran into trouble with the 
Nigerian Customs authorities. After a civil action by Innoson against the Customs authorities 
the courts ruled in Innoson’s favour. Innoson then proceeded to obtain a third-party debt 
order which directed GTB to pay the Customs authorities from funds held by the Bank for 
the Customs authorities. GT Bank appealed this order. Separately, Innoson also claimed that 
GTB had overcharged the company interest that amounted to a large sum and resulted in a 
suit by GTB against Innoson. And finally separate from this, GTB filed a petition against 
Innoson and five others alleging criminal conspiracy to commit forgery by falsify shipping 
documents which were used to obtain a facility from GTB and this resulted in criminal 
prosecution. However, in February 2016, the police withdrew this charge against Innoson 
and the others. Subsequently, the EFCC sent an invitation to the promoter of Innoson, 
Innocent Chukwuma which appears to be in connection with the petition filed by GT Bank. 
The facts of the investigation by the EFCC are not in the public domain and therefore cannot 
be analysed in this Paper. Again, the blurred lines between civil and criminal matters are 
evident here. It is our view that the case was clearly civil in its origin and the EFCC lacked 
jurisdiction over the dispute. 
The recurring pattern in the three decisions discussed above consists of two parts. Firstly, 
the formalized repetition of the legal principle with respect to the exhaustive statutory 
power of the EFCC to conduct investigations on any form of economic and financial crimes. 
Secondly and somewhat contradictorily, the persistent pronouncement of the court that the 
EFCC is not permitted to act as an arbiter of purely civil disputes. 
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5. Recommendations 
In the light of the analysis above our recommendations are a mix of long and short term. The 
facts from the cases discussed, and through a study of the EFCC’s annual reports, show that 
EFCC had in most instances interfered in disputes that were clearly contractual and breaches 
of commercial terms despite reprimands from the Nigerian courts. One conclusion that 
stands out from the propositions in this research is that the urge to use law enforcement 
institutions, such as the EFCC and the Nigerian Police, in the resolution of contractual and 
commercial disputes, is primarily attributable to the lack of trust by litigants in the civil 
dispute resolution mechanisms provided by the State. The civil judicial system is fraught with 
delays with heavy cost implications. It is evident that reform is required in the Nigerian 
judicial system to reduce delay and cost attendant to civil litigation. 
The Lagos State Judiciary has been attempting to address the issue of delays and distortions 
in civil cases, especially in terms of financial claims with a few innovative rules such as the 
2012 and 2019 Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
46
 One of the overarching 
objectives of the Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 (2019 Rules) is the 
efficient and prompt resolution of disputes and the promotion of alternative dispute 
resolution. The 2019 Rules incorporates a Fast Track procedure for civil matters—in respect 
of an ascertainable sum for a minimum of 100 Million Naira47. It is envisaged that civil claims 
within the Fast Track will be determined within one or two years from the date the claim 
was commenced. Furthermore, the Rules now incorporate provisions targeted at reducing 
delays in the resolution of commercial disputes.
48
  
The 2019 Rules now also recognise a stricter Pre-Action Protocol whereby parties must 
explore options of alternative dispute settlement by negotiation, mediation or arbitration 
before processes for litigation can be validly filed by the aggrieved parties.
49
 Lagos State 
Judiciary has also introduced a Small Claims Court within the Magistrate Court System in 
respect of disputes not exceeding Five Million Naira.
50
 The Small Claims Procedures require 
that commercial disputes must be resolved within 60 days from the commencement of the 
action.
51
 These are commendable steps in restoring the confidence of the public in the civil 
dispute settlement mechanisms. This is also an effective way of reducing market restricting 
 
 
46
 Lagos State Judiciary, High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 (Lagos State Printing Corporation, Lagos 
2019). 
47
 The Fast Track rule also applies to claims for mortgage and charge on security 
48
 See for example, ibid, Order 48 Rule 4 where the penalty for defaulting on the Rules has increased from Nair 200 to Naira 
1000.. 
49
 Lagos State Judiciary, (Expeditious Disposal of Civil Cases) Practice Direction No 2 of 2019. 
50
 Lagos State Judiciary, Lagos State Small Claims Practice Directions (Lagos State Printing Corporation, Lagos 2018)  
51
 ibid, Article 12. 
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corruption as the corrupting here occurs mainly due to the distortionary nature (prone to 
delays and time and resource consuming) of civil proceedings. There is however much to be 
done.  
The above innovations have only been adopted by the Lagos State Judiciary; the other thirty-
five states of the Federation of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory need to consider 
adopting similar or better reforms to tackle delays and other weaknesses of the judicial 
systems. The Federal Judicial System (comprising of the Federal High Court, the National 
Industrial Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court) need to also embrace reforms 
necessary to resolve daunting challenges facing the judiciary.  
The financial threshold for the Small Claims Court may be increased to Ten Million Naira and 
the financial threshold for the Fast Track should be reduced to Fifty Million Naira. This will 
increase the number of civil disputes that will fall these schemes. Our research suggests that 
these courts have been very successful in Lagos State. We therefore recommend their 
adoption in other states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory.  
In the longer term our recommendations would include a push towards the EFCC publishing 
its rules on procedures for investigating cases and discontinuing them. The EFCC has internal 
guidelines and once these are made public, given its mandate as a public body and an ACA, 
the ‘rules of the game’ would become clarified forcing legal professionals to at least give 
deeper consideration before submitting petitions to the EFCC over matters that are 
obviously civil in nature.  
Another recommendation which would ideally have the oversight of the Nigerian Attorney 
General would be to devise and publish a triaging process in terms of how the agency 
prioritises cases. Admittedly this would not dramatically reduce political corruption for 
reasons described in Section 1 but it would help address those instances where the relative 
power of the concerned private sector players is not very high. The more powerful players 
would still be able to violate the rules while the smaller players would find them more 
constraining as their bargaining power would be lower.  
It is possible that recourse to a Small Claims Court would find support among smaller 
entrepreneurs and private sector players who typically do not have the financial and political 
resources to engage in lengthy legal disputes. The experience of all the legal practitioners we 
spoke to suggested one area to explore would fall well within the ACE strategy cluster of 
‘building coalitions’ or engage in policy change through collective action (Khan et al, 2019). 
The fact that the Small Claims Courts are already providing access to speedy legal recourse 
to players in relevant disputes is one reason why putting pressure on the relevant legal 
authorities could work in other locations. The incentive to not move the EFCC for those small 
and medium players with access will be reduced and the precedent set by the Lagos 
Judiciary can be considered a model for others to emulate relatively easily. 
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6. Conclusion 
This Paper argues that powerful private actors compel the statutory powers of the EFCC in 
pursuit of purely civil and commercial claims. Four cases were examined in support of this 
argument.  
There are few legal constraints on the discretion afforded to ACAs to investigate and 
prosecute economic and financial crimes, and especially the EFCC. The few limits that exist 
stem from other safeguards such as due process considerations and constitutional 
safeguards. The law establishing the EFCC gives it almost exclusive discretion to decide 
whether to investigate or prosecute any alleged crime. This is however without prejudice to 
the constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused person such as the 
presumption of innocence, fundamental right to a fair hearing including the principle of law 
that the prosecutions must prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of 
an accused52.  
The EFCC is a key agency driving Nigeria’s anti-corruption activities and it has achieved 
significant successes over the years. However, it has also extended itself as argued above 
and such extension has stretched its scant resources. Consequently, there is the need to 
publish some regulatory parameters to guide both the EFCC and the private actors who 
make recourse to it in the prosecution of their private civil matters, as to the nature of the 
matters that fall within the core mandate of the EFCC.  
  
 
 
52
 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) 
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